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Vor,. XIX. JUNE, I92I No. 8 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS BY A BARE MAJORITY 
OF THE COURT. 
I N December, I823, the legislature of Kentucky, in a blaze of re-sentment against a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States invalidating a Kentucky statute,1 petitioned Congress "so to 
organize the Supreme Court of the United States that no constitu-
tional question * * * involving the validity of State laws, shall be 
decided by said Court unless two-thirds of all the members belong-
ing to said court shall concur in such decision."2 At the same time 
a United States senator from Kentucky was demanding that Con-
gress· require for such decisions the concurrence of seven judges out 
of a Supreme Court of ten.3 Last year ( I920) a former attomey-
general of the state of Michigan declared, "I am certain that if a 
law were passed by which a two-thirds vote of the entire member· 
ship of the Court would be required before an Act of Congress 
could be declared void, it would be a lasting benefit and for the good 
of all."~ During the span of nearly a hundred years which separates 
1 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat I (1823), holding unconstitutional Kentucky 
statutes of I7<;/J and 1812 which protected squatter holdings. This decision, 
intrinsically unpopular, was rendered more so by the widespread belief that 
the decision was rendered by only three judges, or a minority of the court 
of seven. This belief seems to have been erroneous. For discussions of this 
situation see B:evaIDG:e, Lin OF ]ORN MARSHALL, IV, 375-382; CoRWIN, 
JoRN M.ARSRALI. AND TR:e CoNSTITU'l'IoN, 184-185; Charles Warren, "Legis-
lative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court," 47 AMER. L. R:ev. Z>-2']. 
• Acrs oF ~NTUCKY, 1823. This resolution was passed Dec. 29, 182s. 
Portions of it are printed in Al.t:es, STA~ DOCUM~TS ON F:en:eRAL R:er.A-
TIONS, 107. 
•ANNALS oF CoNG., 18th Cong., 1st Sess. 28. See B:EVJUUDG:e, op. cit., 
iv, 37g. 
'Fred A. Maynard, "Five to Four Decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States," 54 AMER. LAW R:ev. 512. 
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these expressions of opinion there has been every now and again 
fresh expression of the same belief that the Supreme Court ought 
not to be able to declare legislative acts unconstitutional by a bare 
majority of the court.5 
In general there have been two main grounds upon which five-to-
four decisions of the Supreme Court upon questions of constitu-
tional law have been attacked. In the first place, it is urged that 
when the Supreme Court invalidates a statute by such a narrow 
margin it violates one of the most firmly established doctrines of 
constitutional construction-the doctrine of reasonable doubt; a 
doctrine which holds that an act of the legislature must be presumed 
by the courts to be constitutional until its unconstitutionality is dem-
onstrated beyond all reasonable doubt, and that all reasonable doubts 
regarding the constitutionality of a law will be resolved in favor of 
the law. Many eminent jurists and constitutional lawyers6 are in 
accord with the view which Watson has clearly stated in the follow-
ing words: 
"Can it be said that an aet. is a clear violation of the Consti-
tution when five justices declare it to be so, and four declare 
with equal emphasis that it is clearly not so? All doubt must 
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law, and 
it must be clear in the mind of the court that the law is un..: 
constitutional. But can this condition exist when four of the 
justices are equally earnest, equally emphatic, equally persist-
ent and equally contentious in their position that a law is 
clearly constitutional ?"7 
There are others who criticize these bare majority decisions upon 
the broader grounds of expediency and policy; these believe that it 
would serve the public interest to require that the Supreme Court 
may invalidate a statute only by a unanimous decision or by some 
specified extraordinary majority. There are, of course, many writ-
ers who criticize majority decisions upon both of these grounds, but 
it should be recognized at the outset that the "reasonable doubt" ar-
gument and the argument from expediency are quite different and 
have no necessary connection with each other. It is the purpose of 
• These proposals are summarized, infra, p. 795. 
•Infra, p: 783 • 
• w ATSON ON CONSTITUTION, II, II90, note. 
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this paper to discuss majority decisions in some detail from the 
standpoint of each of these two criticisms. 
I. MAJORITY Dsc1sroNs AND THE DocTRINE mi' REASONABLE DounT 
The question whether a five-to-four decision declaring a statute 
unconstitutional must be regarded as a repudiation of the doctrine 
that all reasonable doubts regarding the validity of a law must be 
resolved in favor of the law is not a question which can be disposed 
of in the glib and casual manner in which many writers have dealt 
with it. The pungent allusion in one of our weekly journals to "the 
oft recurring scandal of five members of the Supreme Court solemn-
ly adjudging that the other four hold opinions which no reasonable 
man can entertain,"8 carries with it a certain smack of plausibility, 
but inquiring minds should not be too ready to accept such self-sat-
isfied criticisms at their face value. Whether or not a five-to-four 
decision invalidating a law violates the doctrine of reasonable doubt 
depends upon what the doctrine of reasonable doubt really is. To 
determine this it becomes necessary to make sure, not what writers 
and critics think the doctrine means, or think it ought to mean, but 
the precise meaning attached to it by the courts which have created 
and applied it. Some discussion, therefore, of the origin, basis, and 
nature of the doctrine of reasonable doubt as a canon of judicial 
construction becomes pertinent. 
1. The Origin and Early Development of the Doctrine of Rea-
sonable Doubt. One or two interesting facts may be noted regard-
ing the early history of the doctrine of reasonable doubt. Seven 
years before the Supreme Court officially announced in Marbury 
v. Madi.s01i9 that it possessed the power to declare acts of Congress 
unconstitutional, Justice Samuel Chase declared in Hylton v. United 
States10 that "if the court have such power, I am free to declare, 
that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case." But in the 
first case in which the Supreme Court actually invalidatea an act 
•The New Republic, July 30, 1917, Vol. XI, 410. 
• 1 Cranch 137 (18o3). 
10 3 Dall. 171, I75 (1796). See also the following statement made two 
years later by Mr. Justice Iredell: "If any act of Congress, or of the legis-
lature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably 
void, though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate 
and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority, but in ·a clear 
and urgent case." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399 (1798). 
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of Congress there is not the ~lightest allusion to any presumption 
that the law was valid or that any reasonable doubt could possibly 
exist as to its invalidity.11 Even in spite of the strong presumptions 
which might have been raised in favor of the statute and the strong 
doubts as to the correctness of Marshall's view of its invalidity12 
there is no evidence that he felt the slightest compunction in over-
ruling an act of a coordinate branch of the government. In fact, 
a careful reading of Marbury v. Madison leaves one with the dis-
tinct impression that Marshall regarded the unconstitutionality of a 
statute as an objective and visible chara,cteristic as to the existence 
or non-existence of which there could be no question. The process 
of discovering such unconstitutionality is as simple as the task of a 
child sorting black and white pieces of cardboard-some are black, 
some are white, ·but it is perfectly easy to tell which is which and 
the awkward question of where to classify gray pieces is conven-
iently side-stepped.13 It will also be noted in this connection that 
nowhere in the two long chapters which Story devotes in his com-
mentaries to the problem of constitutional interpretation by the 
courts does he allude to the doctrine of reasonable doubt or deviate 
in any substantial way from Marshall's viewpoint in Marbury v. 
Madison.1"' It is true, furthermore, that in none of the first six 
cases in which the Supreme Court declared acts of Congress uncon-
n Marshall in the course of his opinion in Marbury v. Madison does 
refer to the "peculiar delicacy of this case." (1 Cranch 154). There is no 
evidence, however, that he had in mind anything but the turbulent political 
events out of which the litigation ·had arisen. 
12 Seldom have stronger presumptions of validity surrounded a statute. 
Ellsworth, Marshall's predecessor as Chief Justice, had drafted the act while 
a member of the first Congress. Not less than twelve members of the Con-
vention of 1787 had either worked for or voted for the act while in Congress. 
In two earlier cases the Supreme Court had assumed the jurisdiction which 
Marshall now finds Congress could not constitutionally confer. United 
States v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42 (1795); United States v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121 
(1795). The theory that the statute was unconstitutional seems to have been 
Marshall's own personal invention. See Br:v:eRIDGr:, op. cit., III, 127-129. For 
a strong argument tending to show that the statute should have been upheld 
see CORWIN, THE DocnuNr: oit ]UDlCIAJ, Rr:vxr:w, Ch. I. 
"'This seems to have been characteristic of Marshall's mental processes. 
"His invariable quest," says Corwin, "was for the axiomatic, for absolute 
principles,'' JoHN MARSHAI.J. AND 'tHE CoNS'tl'tU'tlON, 123. 
14 [3rd Ed.], Bk. III, Ch. IV, V. 
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stitutional did the court say any thing about reasonable doubt 13 
Of course merely because a sta:tute is invalidated without any-
thing being said about this doctrine it does not follow that the court 
did not apply the principles of it in reaching its decision. It is cer-
tainly true that the doctrine came to be recognized at a very early 
date as a sound rule of judicial construction. Marshall himself gave 
p. somewhat qualified statement of the doctrine in the case of Fletch-
er v. Peck, in 1810, in which he declared :16 · 
"The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to 
the Constitution, is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, 
which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, 
in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty to ren-
der such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could 
it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station 
imposes. But it is not on slight implication and vague con-
jecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have tran-
scended its powers, and its Acts to be considered as void. 
The opposition between the Constitution and the law should 
be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of 
their incompatibility with each other." 
In deciding the case of Green v. Biddle, in 1823, Mr. Justice 
Washington sought to allay the storm of protest which it has already 
been seen17 greeted that decision, by solemnly declaring that the 
Court had attached every possible weight to the presumption that 
the state statute in question was constitutional. He said: 
"We hold ourselves answerable to God, our consciences and 
our country to decide this question according to the dictates 
of our best judgment, be the consequences of the decision 
what they may. If we have ventured to entertain a wish as 
to the result of the investigation which we have laboriously 
given to the 1:ase, ~t was that it might be favorable to the val-
11 In addition to Marbury v. Madison, supra, these cases were: Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856) ; Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 
561 (1864); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866); Reichert v. Felps, 6 Wall. 
100 (1867); The Alicia, 7 Wall. 571 (1868). Mr. Justice Miller refers to the 
doctrine in his dissent in the Garland case, but the case of Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, 8 Wall. 6o3 (1869), is the first in which the opinion of the majority 
discusses the doctrine. 
18 6 Cranch 87 (1810): 
"Supra, note 1. 
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idity of the laws; our feeling being always on that side of 
the question unless the objections to them are fairly and clear-
ly made out."18 
Four years later the same justice speaking for the court in the 
case of Ogden v. Saunders gave utterance to what has been regarded 
very generally as the classic statement of the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt. After remarking that the question of the validity of the 
stat~te under review was a doubtful one he went on to say: 
"If I could rest my opinion in favor of the constitution-
ality of the law * * * on no other ground than this doubt, so 
felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estimation, 
be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect 
due to the * * >J: legislative body by which any law is passed, 
to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the 
Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This has 
always been the language of this court when that subject has 
called for its decision, and I know it expresses the honest sen-
timents of each and every member of this bench."19 
The unanimity with which the doctrine of reasonable doubt has 
come to be accepted as the only correct and orthodox rule of judicial 
construction is attested by subsequent judicial utterances numbering 
into the thousands20 as well as by the statements of practically every 
commentator in the field of constitutional law. Needless to say it 
is a doctrine which has also been adhered to by state courts in pass-
ing upon the validity of state and federal statutes. 
It is highly important to keep in mind that this doctrine is not one 
which has been imposed upon the courts by the Constitution or by 
statutes. It is merely a rule or canon of construction which the 
courts.have with virtual unanimity imposed upon themselves.21 It 
is a sort of judicial "self-denying ordinanee."22 
18 8 Wheat. 1, 93 (I823). 
10 12 Wheat. 2I3, 270 (I827). 
"' Persons with a passion for statistics will find ample data upon this 
point compiled in the Century and American Digests. 
"' "These rules are self-established, under a sense of propriety and 
expediency, and are not created by any constitutional necessity." WILLOUGH-
BY ON CONSTITUTION, I, I2. See also BLACK ON INTERPRETATION OF LAW, 7. 
"'The judicial origin of the rule is emphasized by the fact that in the 
following groups of cases the presumption of constitutionality does not at-
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2. The Theoretical Rasis for the Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt. 
Naturally a doctrine which has so firmly embedded itself in our 
judicial traditions rests upon several theoretical and practical 
grounds which may be briefly commented upon. 
tach to a statute. (I) "If the question at issue as to whether a given power 
resides in the Federal Government or in the States, the fact that a state 
1egislature in its enactment has asserted that it is vested in the states. is no 
presumption in favor of the validity of this decision. The Supreme Court 
in passing finally upon this point is not, then, called upon to review the act 
of a coordinate department, but has to decide between the conflicting claims 
of two governments, and quite properly feels itself at liberty to decide the 
point as an original proposition; namely, upon the basis of its own judg-
ment as to what the most reasonable construction of the constitutional pro-
visions involved." Wn.r.<>UGHBY ON CoNSTlTUTION, I, 22. This is undoubted-
ly sound theory, but it may be questioned whether in practice the ::.upreme 
Court has proceeded on the theory that "Such state laws as these need not be 
presumed to be valid. Note the language of the court, for instance, in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. l, 186; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 436. 
(2) In spite of the weight of authority to the contrary, there are certain 
jurisdictions in which in the interests of justice the courts have felt obliged 
to recognize that one statute may be void "on its face" while another may 
not, in determining whether a public officer is entitled to protection for torts 
or crimes committed in the enforcement of an unc9nstitutional statute. In 
these jurisdictions he is protected only if the act was invalid "on its face." 
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. Hammond, 93 Ia. 520 (1895); Henke v. 
McCord, 55 Ia. 378 (188o); Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J .• L. 455 (1906); Ses-
sums v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335 (1870); Shafford v. Brown, 49 Wash. 307 (1go8); 
State v. McNally, 34 Me . .210 (1852), dictum. See also THAYER, Lr:GAI. 
EssAYS, 25-26. (3) There are also cases in which the courts have actually 
presumed statutes to be void unless their validity could be positively estab-
lished. "Where it is proposed by a statute to deny, modify or diminish a 
right or immunity secured to the people by an explicit constitutional pro-
vision, the presumption is against the validity of the statute." Salter v. 
State, 2 Okla. Cr. 464, 479 (1909). See also Covington C. L. Turnpike Co. 
v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 595 (1896). The dearest illustration of this is to 
be found in the early attitude of the courts toward police legislation, par-
ticularly protective labor legislation. During the eighties the doctrine of 
"liberty of contract" as one of the ingredients of the due process of law 
guarantee began to be applied by the courts. The practical effect was to 
create a prima facie case against the validity of any social or labor legisla-
tion which impinged upon this liberty of contract. The burden was placed 
on the proponents of such laws to establish their constitutionality by positive 
proof. See Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 18 YAI.i> L. JoUR. 454; Freund, 
"Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation," 4 Iu •. LAW Rr:v. 009; 
Kales, "New Methods in Due-Process Cases," 12 AMER. Poz.. Sci. RJ;v. 241, 
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In the first place, it must be recognized that in a very large num-
ber of cases there is ample room for an honest and intelligent differ-
ence of opinion with reference to the meaaj.ng and application of 
constitutional provisions. Some constitutional clauses are ambig-
uous, and no man or body of men can justly say that their construc-
tion of them is the only correct one. Other constitutional provisions 
are so broad and general in their terms that their application to con-
crete situations may open up questions which, as Dean James P. Hall 
says, "depend upon the interpretation of c~i:nplex social and eco-
nomic facts, where reasonable men may disagree widely in their con-
<;Iusions."23 This situation arises most frequently, perhaps, in the 
effort to settle the vexed question at what point laws passed in the 
exercise of the police power of the state begin to violate the guar-
3:0tee of due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment. As Mr. 
Justice Holmes has aptly expressed it, "We have few scientifically 
certain criteria of legislation, and it is often difficult to mark the 
line where what is called the police power of the states is limited by 
the Constitution of the United States."24 It may, then, be concluded 
that one reason why the courts feel that they must assume that the 
legislature "is right in its solution of a constitutional question is that 
it is often so difficult to prove conclusively that any one view of the 
question is clearly wrong. 
In the second place, the presumption that Congress has not ex-
ceeded its constitutional powers in enacting a statute is grounded 
upon what Mr. Justice Strong in Knox v. Lee termed "a decent re-
spect for a coordinate branch of the Federal Government."25 It was 
said in the Sinking Fund Cases:26 
and numerous cases cited in these articles. Decisions embodying this doc-
trine were severely criticised and in recent years the courts are usually re-
fusing to recognize any prima facie invalidity in a police statute merely be-
cause it restricts liberty of contract. See for example Erie R. R. Co. v. 
Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914); State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259 (1914). (4) 
"By weight of authority, when part of it [statute] has been declared uncon-
stitutional, the presumption in favor of constitutionality will not be indulged 
in as to the remaining portion." 12 CORPUS JURIS, 8oo and cases cited. 
23 
HALI.,, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36-37. 
"'Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. 110 (19n) . 
.. 12 Wall. 457, 531 (1872). See also the passage from Ogden v. Saun-
ders quoted above, page 776. 
"'99 u. s. 700, 718 (1878). 
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"Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of 
the statute and this continues until the contrary is shown be-
yond all rational doubt. One branch of the government can-
not encroach on the domain of another without danger. The 
safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a 
strict observance of this salutary rule." 
This whole point is most clearly summarized by Professor Wil-
loughby in a paragraph which may well be quoted in full :27 
"The fact that Congress has given a particular construction 
to a constitutional provision, is of very great weight with the 
Supreme Court when it is called upon to examine the correct-
ness of this interpretation. This is due to the fact that the 
court is dealing with the act of a separate and independent 
departmen..t of government which the Constitution intends to 
be, so far as possible, coordinate in power with the executive 
and judicial departments; that is, coordinate in the sense that, 
like them, when acting within the limits of the power consti-
tutionally granted, it shall be independent of control by the 
others. 
"From necessity the Constitution must have intended that 
the legislative and executive departments should have the 
power, in the first instance at least, of determining the extent 
of the powers constitutionally granted to them, and that, 
therefore, the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for 
theirs except in cases where there is no doubt that the action 
which has been taken is not constitutionally warranted." 
In short, the presumption that a congressional act is constitutional 
may be said to rest upon a sort of interdepartmental comity. 
This "decent respect" for a coordinate branch of the government 
is substantially heightened by the fact that all members of the legis-
lature take a solemn oath to support the Constitution and to act in 
accordance wih its provisions. They assume under such an oath the 
responsibility of considering with care the constitutionality of every 
law which they pass and they are under an obligation to refrain 
from passing a law if they entertain honest doubts as to its validity. 
At least this is the orthodox judicial view of the duties imposed on 
21 Wn.LoUGHBY, I, 20. See also COOLEY, CoNsTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 
227; McCLAIN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THI> UNITED STATES, 2I; TucKER, 
CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, I, 376. 
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the lawmaker by his oath. of office ;28 whether there is any evidence 
that he actually does take his responsibilities in respect to constitu-
tional questions with equal solemnity is, of course, a very different 
l!latter.29 But certainly the courts can hardly do less than to assume 
that the members of the legislature will respect the. oath of office 
which they all take; and to assume this must, of course, raise the 
presumption that the laws enacted are only such as the lawmaking 
body regards, after careful deliberation, as being of unquestionable 
constitutionality. 
3. What Is a "Reasonable Doubt.f" If we are to determine wheth-
er a five-to-four decision of the Supreme Court violates the doctrine 
of reasonable doubt, the q~estion naturally arises, when is a doubt 
to be regarded as reasonable. Without claiming to have examined 
every one of the multitude of judicial answers which have been given 
to this question the writer believes that they will all be found to fall 
into three general classes. In the first place, there are numerous 
cases in which the courts have set up what may be called the "rea-
sonable man" test,-4:he rule that no act should be held invalid so 
'"This has been put most clearly· by Cooley, who says: "They [the 
legislature] legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is not 
to be supposed they will disregard. It must, therefore, be supposed that their 
own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have been deliberately 
solved in its favor, so th!l-t the courts may, with some confidence repose upon 
their conclusion, as one based upon their best judgment. For although it is 
plain, upon the authorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action 
when not clearly satisfied of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason that 
the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if not fully assured 
of their authority to. do so. Respect for the instrument under which they 
exercise their power should impel the legislature in every case to solve their 
doubts in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume they do so, that 
the courts are warranted in giving weight in any case to their decision. If 
it were understood that legislators refrained from exercising their judgment, 
or that, in cases of doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in favor of the 
action they desired to accomplish, the foundation for the cases we have cited 
would be altogether taken away." CoNS'tlTUTIONAL Ln.nTATIONS, 254 
""It is generally understood and frequently lamented that legislative 
bodies are continually passing laws the constitutionality of which they regard 
as doubtful, for the express purpose of getting a judicial decision upon the 
questfon of the validity of such statutes. See the recent case of Evans v. 
Gore, 253 U.S.--; 64 L. Ed. 598 (1920), in which the Supreme Court said, 
"Moreover, it appears that, when this taxing provision was adopted, Congress 
regarded it as of uncertain constitutionality, and both contemplated and in-
tended that the question should be settled by us in a case like this." See 
also THAYJ>R, Ll';GAL EssAYS, 24. 
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long as any reasonable or intelligent man could entertain any doubts 
as to its invalidity. Two of th~ many statements of this rule will 
suffice. In an early Georgia case it is declared :30 
"This violation of a constitutional right ought to be as ob-
vious to the comprehension of every one as an axiomatic 
truth, as that the parts are equal to the whole." 
In a South Carolina decision the court says :81 
"The validity of the law ought not then to be questioned 
unless it is so obviously repugnant to the constitution that 
when pointed out by the judges, all men of sense and reflec-
tion in the community may perceive the repugnancy." 
In the second place, many courts have made use of the analogy 
between the presumption of innocence to which a person accused of 
crime is entitled and the presumption of constitutionality which 
arises in favor of a statute; and have suggested that the reasonable 
doubt which when felt by a jury in deciding the guilt or innocence 
of the accused must lead to his acquittal is the same reasonable doubt 
in nature and degree which should lead a -court to uphold the consti-
tutionality of a statute. In other words, a court must be precisely 
as ready to pronounce a law valid in a doubtful case as a jury is to 
acquit in a doubtful case.82 
In the third place, it will be found that the vast majority of judges 
make no effort to find synonyms for the expression "reasonable 
doubt" or to set up any definite standards by which it is to be meas-
ured. Or else they content themselves with making the somewhat 
obvious statement that by a "reasonable doubt" is meant a rational 
doubt. In fact, their point of view in the matter would probably be 
accurately expressed in the following words of a judge of the su-
preme court of Ohio :88 
""Grimball v. Ross, Charlton's Reports, 175 (18o8). See THAYER, op. 
cit., 18. 
:11 Adm'rs of Byrne v. Adm'rs of Stewart, 3 Des. 4()6 (1812). See Kales, 
"New Methods in Due Process of Law," 12 AMER. PoL. Scr. ~v. 243; 
THAYER, op. cit., 19. 
12 "The lawmaking power of the state is entitled to at least as strong a 
presumption in favor of the validity of its acts as a criminal on trial in favor 
of his innocence." Gilbert v. Green, 185 Ky. 817, 828 (1919) • 
.. Dissenting opinion of Davis, C. J., in State ex rel. Weinberger v. 
Miller, 87 Oh. St. 27, 53 (1912). 
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"The phrase "reasonable doubt" has been the subject of 
much analysis and many refined distinctions, especially in 
criminal cases, but it seems to be incapable of satisfactory 
definition, probably because it defines itself; for a reasonable 
doubt is, after all that has been said, a doubt that is reason-
able, and until definite limits can be found for the word "rea-
sonable" the phrase cannot be made any clearer by definition. 
For practical purposes it is easier to say what is not a rea-
sonable doubt than to frame an all inclusive definition of the 
phrase, and it is generally agreed that a merely speculative 
or captious doubt raised to avoid a disagreeable conclusion is 
not a reasonable doubt." 
It seems on the whole very probable that in the three classes of 
cases just discussed the courts have all been trying to say the same 
thing, and that in spite of their diversity of expression they have 
applied the very same doctrine in the very same way: that the test 
of the actual existence of and reasonableness of any doubt in the 
judicial mind as to the constitutiqnality of a statute is a test which 
the court itself must apply accordingly to its own intellectual pro-
cesses. It is a subjective and not an objective test; the reasonable 
doubt, if there is any, must exist in the mind of the court. 
Keeping in mind the facts which have been brought out with re-
spect to the origin, basis and nature of the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt, we are now prepared to approach the alleged repudiation of 
that doctrine by five-to-four decisions upon questions of constitu-
tionality. 
4. The Argument That Five-to-Four Decisions Invalidating Stat-
utes Violate the Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt. The argument that 
a majority decision declaring a statute un<:onstitutional is utterly in-
<:onsistent with the doctrine of reasonable doubt has been briefly 
alluded to at the outset of this paper34 and need not be greatly elabor-
ated here. That argument proceeds somewhat along the following 
lines: Five judges believe that a statute is unconstitutional; four 
judges believe it to be constitutional. Therefore the question of its 
constitutionality is a doubtful question. That this doubt as to the 
constitutionality of the statute is a "reasonable doubt" must of 
course be admitted unless one is to impugn the wisdom of the four 
dissenting justices. Now the doctrine of reasonable doubt demands 
" Supra, p. 772. 
FIVE TO FOUR DECISIONS 
that the Supreme Court shall presume every act of Congress to be 
constitutional and shall continue to act upon that presumption until 
the unconstitutionality of the statute has been demonstrated beyond" 
a reasonable doubt. And yet in the face of a reasonable doubt upon 
that question, a doubt evidenced by the fact that four of their col-
leagues equally learned with themselves disagree with them, a bare 
majority of the court presumes to pass final judgment that the act is 
void. It must be quite obvious that such a decision is a virtual re-
pudiation of the reasonable doubt rule of construction. The sub-
stance of this argument has been advanced by many distinguished 
jurists and scholars, among whom may be mentioned Judge Bald-
win,35 Professor Goodnow,36 Mr. W. F. Dodd,87 Mr. C. W. Collins,88 
and Mr. Watson, whose statement of it was quoted above.39 
.. "It has been judicially asserted that it [inconsistency of statute with 
Constitution] must be plain beyond a reasonable doubt, thus applying a rule 
of evidence which governs the disposition of a criminal cause. As judg-
ments declaring a statute inconsistent are often rendered by a divided court, 
this position seems practically untenable. The majority must concede that 
there is a reasonable doubt whether the statute may not be consistent with 
the Constitution, since some of their associates either must have such a 
doubt, or go further and hold that there is no inconsistency between the two 
documents." THS AMERICAN JUDICIARY, 103. 
"" "Finally, it is possible * * * to provide that no court shall decide an 
act of a legislative body to be unconstitutional, unless the decision is reached 
by a unanimous action of the members of the court or by the action of any 
majority that might be determined upon. * * * Such a provision would also 
really bring it about that our practice would accord with our theory, which 
is that in order that an act of the legislature be declared void by a court its 
unconstitutionality, like the guilt of a person charged with crime, must be 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt." SOCIA!, RsroRM AND THS CONSTITUTION, 
352. 
31 "The principle that a statute must not be declared invalid unless its 
inconsistency with the constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt has, 
as Judge Baldwin suggests, become untenable, because such decisions are 
frequently rendered by a divided court, whose dissenting members must be 
presumed to have a reasonable doubt regarding the question of constitu-
tionality. In fact, it may be said to be true that practically all important 
decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional are now rendered by divided 
courts." "The Growth of Judicial Power," 24 PoL. Sex. QUART. 193. 
38 "Surely then a law is not clearly and manifestly unconstitutional when 
one or more of the members of the Court itself have serious doubts as to 
the question." THS FouRTSSNTH AMSNDMSNT AND THS STATSS, 16g. 
"'S11pra, p. 772. 
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While the conclusiveness of the chain of reasoning just outlined 
has usually been regarded by its authors as entirely self-evident, it 
has frequently ·been felt that additional strength is lent to this view 
by the fact that all the members of a petit jury must agree upon the 
guilt of the accused in order to overcome beyond reasonable doubt 
the presumption of his innocence. A person accused of crime is 
presumed to be innocent until ·his guilt has been demonstrated be-
yond all reasonable doubt, and his guilt is held not to be demon-
strated beyond all reasonable doubt so long as a single juror either 
believes him innocent or entertains reasonable doubts as to his guilt. 
The strktness with which this rule of unanimity in jury verdicts 
has been adhered to for centuries demonstrates how ridiculous it 
is to say that a statute has been proved invalid beyond reasonable 
doubt when four out of nine judges believe the statute to be consti-
tutional.~ 
It now remains to analyze and appraise these very plausible argu-
ments and·present what may be said in reply. 
5. The Argument That Five-to-Four Decisions Are Not Inconsist-
ent with the Doctrine of Reasonabl-e Doubt. The first argument de-
signed to refute the contentions just stated is one based on Thayer's 
interesting theory of the real nature of the function performed by a 
court in passing upon the constitutionality of an act passed by a co-
ordinate branch of the government. This theory may best be stated 
ill Thayer's own words :u 
"The courts have perceived with more or less distinctness 
that this exercise of the judicial function does in truth go 
far beyond the simple business which judges sometimes de-
scribe. If their duty were in truth merely and nakedly to 
ascertain the meaning of the text of the constitution and of 
the impeached Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an 
academic question, whether in the court's judgment the two 
were in conflict, it would to be sure, be an elevated and im-
portant office, one dealing with great matters, involving large 
'°Note 32, supra. 
41 THAYER, LJW.AL EssAYS, 21-22, 30. "A legislative act is not to be de-
clared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between the legislative and 
judicial power. Before proceeding to annul, by judicial sentence, what has 
been enacted by the lawmaking power, it should clearly appear that the act 
cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption." 
People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235, 241 (1858). 
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public considerations, but yet a function far simpler than it 
really is. Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a 
question-the really momentous question-whether, after all, 
the court can disregard the Act. It cannot do this as a mere 
matter of course-merely because it is -concluded that upon a 
just and true construction the law is unconstitutional. That 
is precisely the significance of the rule of administration that 
the courts lay down. It can only disregard the Act when 
those who have the right to make the laws have not merely 
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one-so clear 
that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard 
of duty to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the 
test which they apply,-not merely their own judgment as to 
constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment 
is permissible to another department which the constitution 
has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recog-
nizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfold-
ing exigencies of government, much which will seem uncon-
stitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not 
seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of dif-
ferent interpretations; that there is often a range of choice 
and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not 
impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but 
leaves open this range of choice; and whatever choice is ra-
tional is constitutional * * * the idtimate question is not what 
is the true meaning of the constitution, but whether legisla-
tion is sustainable or not." [·Writer"s italics.] 
In short, the courts are not in these cases to decide whether they 
think a statute is constitutional; they merely decide whether a rea-
sonable man might have thought so. In Thayer's opinion they are 
performing a function closely similar to that of a court in revising 
the verdict of a jury,-"the test is whether a reasonable person 
could, upon the evidence, entertain the jury's opinion."42 
Now if this is true, the significance of a five-to-four decision in-
validating a law is entirely altered. It no longer means that the five 
judges have ignored the reasonable doubts as to the validity of the 
law which are held by their four colleagues. It merely means that 
"'Thayer, "Law and Fact in Jury Trials," 4 HARV. LAW ~v. 167, 168; 
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I, 672; LEGAL ESSAYS, 20-24 
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the majority regard the unconstitutionality of the act as clear be-
yond reasonable doubt, while the minority consider that some might 
hold it as doubtful. All nine judges may agree in their own opin-
ions that the act is invalid; they are divided upon the question wheth-
er a reasonable person must of necessity reach the same conclusion. 
. They differ, in short, not upon the question whether the legislature 
was wrong, but upon the question whether the legislature was so 
palpably and indisputably wrong that no reasonable person could say 
that it was right.~ 
The question at once arises whether this somewhat hair-splitting 
distinction between what a judge thinks and what he thinks a reason-
able man might have thought is actually recognized and acted upon 
by the courts in passing upon the validity of laws. Obviously there can 
be no authoritative answer to this question since few judges are dis-
posed either to examine or to explain their mental processes with 
much minµteness. There are instances in which courts have ex-
pressed doubts as to the constitutionality of statutes but have still 
upheld them.44 There are also ~ases in which dissenting justices 
without placing their own opinions positively on record have main· 
tained that laws ought to be upheld since reasonable men might re-
gard them as valid.45 These cases are most likely to occur when the 
issue of constitutionality before the court is one depending upon 
some question of degree, such as the" limits to which exercises of the 
"After quoting the passage from Baldwin set forth in note 35, supra, 
Willoughby remarks : "This argument is not convincing. Admitting that 
either the one or the other of the two opinions must be conceded to the 
dissenting justices, it does not follow that the doctrine of reasonable doubt 
is shown to be repudiated. The question which the court, as a court, has 
to decide is as to the existence of this reasonable doubt. There may, of 
course, be a difference of opinion as to this, but it is still this fact which the 
court seeks to determine and which controls its decision. It is no more 
proper to say that the principle is repudiated when the court is not unanimous, 
than to hold that in passing by a divided court upon a question of contribu-
tory negligence, the principle of reasonable doubt is not applied." Wn.-
I.OUGHBY ON CONSTITUTION, I, 22, note. 
'""We must therefore, while admitting the question is not free from 
doubt, resolve that doubt in favor of the power of the legislature to authorize 
.the expenditures as provided in the act in question." Denver & R. G. R 
Co. v. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 303 (1917) . 
.. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 
45 (1905), said: "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a 
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police power may be pushed without infringing upon the guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in the by and large one cannot 
read either the majority or dissenting opinions of the courts upon 
constitutional questions without being convinced that the average 
jupge decides a case in accordance with his own honest view of the 
constitutionality of the act involved, and is not worrying about what 
a hypothetical reasonable man might decide. If a court invalidates 
a law it is in most cases because a maj'ority of the judges believe the 
law violates the Constitution; and the judges who dissent from that 
decision do so because they believe it does not.~8 
Nor sh~uld it be overlooked that Thayer's theory does not square 
with and is not intended to square with Marshall's doctrine in Mar-
bury v. Madison as to the basis upon which the court's power to 
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional must rest. That well 
known doctrine is, of -course, that the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land, that it is the essence of judicial duty to determine 
wha~ the law is and to apply it in concrete cases, that the perform-
ance of this duty requires the judges to compare legislative enact-
ments with the Constitution and to refuse to apply as law any stat-
ute which is in conflict with the Constitution.~7 Now there are dis-
large part of this country does not entertain. If it were a question whether 
I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before 
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I 
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with 
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. * * * I think the 
word liberty in the fourteenth amendment, is perverted when it is held to 
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said 
that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute pro-
posed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood 
by the traditions of our people and our law. It does not need research to 
show that no such sweeping condemnation can be passed upon the statute 
before us. A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score 
of health. Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would 
uphold it as a first installment of a general regulation of the hours of work." 
••"If I had entertained doubts of the constitutionality of the law, I must 
have held the law valid until those doubts became convictions. But as I 
have a very decided opinion that Congress acted within the scope of its 
authority, I must hold the law to be constitutional, and dissent from the 
opinion of the court." Mr. Justice Miller dissenting in Hepburn v. Griswold, 
8 Wall. 6o3, 638 (1869). 
41 "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the law to particular cases, must of 
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tinguished writers on constitutional law, Thayer amongst them, who 
severely criticize this doctrine and maintain either directly or by 
inference that the power of judicial review is more political than 
judicial in character ;48 but the fact remains that Marshall's argu-
ment in Marbury v. Madison is still regarded as the orthodox basis 
upon which to rest the power of the courts to invalidate laws and 
would undoubtedly be followed by any judge who felt called upon 
to justify his exercise of such power. Even a casual examination 
of Marshall's doctrine, however, shows that it proceeds on the as-
sumption that "the court's duty * * * is the mere and simple office 
of construing two writings and comparing one with another, as two 
contracts or two statutes are construed and compared when they are 
said to conflict; of declaring the true meaning of each, and,, if they 
are opposed to each other, of carrying into effect the constitution as 
being of superior obligation."49 This clearly imposes on the courts 
the obligation of deciding according to their own best judgment 
whether the statute does conflict with the constitution. They are not 
expected to decide whether the legislature· could reasonably have 
conclude~ that they had power to pass the statute and if so to sus-
tain it even against their own views as to its validity; they are clear-
ly under the duty of passing squarely upon the question whether the 
statute does or does not violate the constitution. They are compar-
ing two documents in an effort to determine what the law is govern-
ing a concrete case. If they do not decide for themselves as a ju-
dicial question whether the two documents conflict but try instead 
to determine whether reasonable men could have harmonized them, 
then it would seem that they have failed to exercise the essential 
duty of declaring what the court finds the law to be, and have in-
stead declared what some one else might reasonably have found it 
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in 
opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to 
a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably 
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or comformably to the constitu-
tion, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these con-
flicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 
Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, I77 (1803) . 
.. THAYER, L:EGAI. ESSAYS, I; HAI.L, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 35; Wn.-
LOUGHBY ON CONSTITUTION, !, 3 . 
.. THAYER, op. cit., 12. 
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to be. If it is not part of the solemn duty of the court to enforce 
its own honestly considered views as to whether the statute conflicts 
with the constitution, regardless of whether or not reasonable men 
might disagree, then, under the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, it is 
hard to see why the court is under any necessity of considering at 
all the possibility of such a conflict. If it is not under obligation in 
all cases to give effect to its own views as to the constitutionality of 
statutes, there seems no logical reason why it should not as a matter 
of course give effect to all the views of the legislature, just as an 
English court does. Thus it would appear that it is only on the 
theory that in passing upon the validity of statutes the coui:ts are 
exercising a power essentially political in origin and nature that 
Thayer's doctrine can be logically supported.Go 
There remains for consideration the proposition that the unani-
mous verdict required in the common law jury system serves as a 
strong argument from analogy for a unanimous decision of a court 
declaring a statute unconstitutional. This argument suffers from 
the weakness -common to most arguments resting on analogy, the 
weakness of allowing certain superficial similarities between the 
things compared to overshadow fundamental distinctions. It is true 
that a person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until prov-
ed beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty ; and it is also true that a 
law is presumed to be constitutional until shown beyond reasonable 
doubt to be unconstitutional. And since the accepted method of 
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt is by a unanimous verdict it 
has been easy to assume that proof of guilt beyond such reasonable 
doubt could not be established without such unanimity. If proof 
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires unanimity of a jury, then 
proof of unconstitutionality beyond reasonable doubt must require 
unanimity on the part of the court. The defect in this argument 
lies in the assumption that the law presumes that the guilt of an 
accused person could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt 
unless the verdict of the jury were unanimous. As a matter of ac-
tual fact the unanimity rule and the doctrine of reasonable doubt are 
separate and distinct elements of the jury system, having no histori-
cal nor logical connection with each other. There are, in short, sev-
00 It should be noted that Thayer himself does not apply this theory to 
the problem of five-to-four decisions. It is Professor Willoughby who 
m'.!kcs this application as set forth in note 43, supra. 
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eral conspicuous points at which the supposed analogy under con-
sideration breaks down. 
It is perfectly plain, in· the first place, that historically the re-
quirement of a unanimous verdict was in no way based on the theory 
that a disagreement would prove the existence of reasonable doubts 
as to the guilt of the accused. Such disagreement ·merely showed 
that there was not evidence enough to convict. The jury was at the 
outset merely a group of neighbors called in to give evidence regard-
ing the crime. Theoretically they testified as to facts lying within 
their own knowledge. "To require that twelve men should be unan-
iinou~ was simply to fix the amount of evidence which the law deem-
ed to be conclusive of a matter in dispute."51 Of course this early 
notion of the function of the jury has not survived; but there seems 
no question but what the modem requirement of unanimity is mere-
ly based on the practical necessity of having some definite and cer-
tain objective test as to guilt or innocence. This test has been stand-
ardized in our law as being met when twelve men chosen for the 
purpose can agree; it is not met when fewer than twelve agree.52 
Some other test might have been -chosen and in earlier times was 
chosen, but.this happens to be the one which has prevailed. 
11 FORSYTHE, HIS'J.'ORY 01" TRIAL BY ]URY, .23!). 
.. "In most modem systems of criminal law, the legislator has felt the 
necessity of providing some cqndition which must be fulfilled before the 
person accused can be punished. In systems founded on the Roman law, 
this condition has generally been the confession of the accused; and the 
theory of torture was that, when a man was vehemently suspected, he should 
be tested, by extreme pain. * * * In our country, the same object is com-
pletely and rationally attained by the unanimity of the jurors. Our law 
contains no rules as to the number of witnesses on whose evidence a man 
must be convicted. It knows nothing of plena or semiplena probatio, but it 
provides that no one shall be considered guilty unless a certain number of 
average persons concur in thinking him so. This concurrence is the gist of 
the institution. Take it away and the verdict of the jury becomes meaning-
less." STEPHEN, GENERAL Vmw ol" THE CRIMINAL LAW ol" ENGLAND, .219-220. 
The essential reason for the unanimity rule is stated by Pollock and 
Maitland: "The parties to the litigation have 'put themselves' upon a certain 
test. That test is the voice of the country. Just as a corporation can have 
but one will, so a country can have but one voice-'le pays vint e dyt'. In a 
later age this communal principle m!ght have led to the acceptance of the 
majority's verdict. But as yet men had not accepted the dogma that the 
voice of a majority binds the community. In communal affairs they de-
manded unanimity; but minorities were expected to give way. Then at this 
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In the second place, if the failure of a jury to agree is to be 
regarded as proving the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the 
guilt of the accused and thereby indicating that the presumption of 
innocence has not been conclusively overthrown, then the only log-
ical course would be for the jury to acquit the prisoner in the event 
of such disagreement. Instead of this, ignoring the supposed rea-
sonable doubt lingering in the minds of some of the jurors, the law 
proceeds to try him over again as though that doubt had never 
arisen.53 Furthermore, there are jurisdictions in which unanimous 
verdicts are not required.54 In Scotland the unanimity rule has 
never existed in criminal cases. 55 And yet no one would be disposed 
to argue that in such jurisdictions the accused did not enjoy the pre-
sumption of innocence until ·that presumption was rebutted beyond 
reasonable doubt. These seem fairly conclusive arguments that even 
at present there is no necessary connection between the doctrine of 
reasonable doubt and the unanimity rule. 
It may be pointed out in addition that there are substantial rea-
point the 'quasi judicial' position of the jurors becomes important. No doubt 
it would be wrong for a man to acquiesce in a verdict that he knew to be 
false; but in the common case-and it becomes commoner daily-many of 
the jurors really have no first-hand knowledge of the facts about which they 
speak, and there is no harm in a juror's joining in a verdict which expresses 
the belief of those of his fellows who do know something. Thus a pro-
fessed unanimity is, as our rolls show, very easily produced. Nor must it 
escape us that the justices are pursuing a course which puts the verdict of 
the country on a level with the older modes of proof. If a man came clean 
from the ordeal or successfully made his law, the due proof would have been 
given; no one could have questioned the dictum of Omniscience. The vere-
dictum patriae is assimilated to the judicium Dei. English judges find that 
a requirement of unanimity is the line of least resistance; it spares them so 
much trouble." HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, II, 624. 
"'"A jury in a criminal case is told to acquit unless guilt is proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. That does not mean that if one or more jurors think the 
prisoner innocent, all should acquit because the difference of opinion shows 
reasonable doubt. It means that each juror shall be clear in his own mind." 
Green, The Judicial Censorship of Legislation, 47 AMER. LA w Rr:v. 90, 98 . 
.. Verdicts by less than a unanimous jury in cases of misdemeanors are 
authorized by the constitutions of Louisiana, Idaho, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Montana. See INDEX DIGts'.l' OF STA'l'r: CoNS'tl'.l'UTIONS, 810. 
"This necessity of a total unanimity seems to be peculiar to our own 
constitution," Coou~v's BLACKSTON~ [4th Ed.], II, n36 • 
.. FoRSY'l'H, op. cit., 332. 
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sons based on practical considerations of public policy which justify 
making it more difficult, by requiring unanimity in the verdict of 
the jury, to rebut the presumption of innocence than to rebut the 
presumption of constitutionality attaching to a statute. In the first 
place, the person accused of crime may be in peril of his life. Until 
a fairly recent period this was apt to be the case if the prisoner was 
charged with any kind of felony. The gross brutality of the early 
criminal law made it a matter of most vital importance that the ac-
cused be given the benefit of every possible doubt. He stood on 
triai facing as his prosecutor the state itself, and mistakes made at 
his expense might prove fatal. But no such reasons exist for mak-
ing it quite so difficult to pronounce invalid a legislative enactment. 
A West Virginia Court puts this distinction very clearly :58 
"It has been said that it is better that ninety-nine guilty 
persons should escape than that one innocent P.erson should 
be condemned. But not so with the question before us. It is 
not ·better that the Constitution should be violated ninety 
and nine times by the legislature than that the courts should 
erroneously hold one act oi the legislature unconstitutional. 
We cannot raise presumptions in favor of legislative infalli-
bility as strong as those of a jury in favor of the innocence 
of a prisoner charged with murder." 
On the whole, a close scrutiny of the question seems to show that 
the analogy of the unanimity requirement in the jury system does 
not afford any support to the view that the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt is violated by a five-to-four decision declaring a statute void. 
It seems to the writer that those who maintain that such a con-
flict or inconsistency does exist fail to understand correctly what 
the doctrine of reasonable doubt actually means. The most work-
able theory in regard to the matter is this : the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt means that a statute should not be declared unconstitutional 
so long as a reasonable doubt as to its invalidity remains in the 
minds of those to whom is entrusted the power to decide the ques-
tion of constitutionality-and under the present rule this means a 
majority of the court. In other words, so long as the rule exists 
that five members of the court decide questions for the court, all 
the doctrine can be reasonably said to mean is that five of the nine 
.. Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 541 (1883). 
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members of the Supreme Court must be sure in their minds that a 
law is invalid.67 This being true, the fact that four other judges 
disagree is entirely irrelevant. A brief examination of this theory 
will show that it is entirely rational and that it is the theory upon 
which our courts have uniformly proceeded. 
In appraising this theory it is important to keep in mind in the 
first place that a majority of the Supreme Court judges may firmly 
believe that a law is invalid beyond all. reasonable doubt in spite of 
the fact that the other four judges believe with equal firmness that 
the law is valid. While judicially minded men would naturally take 
due cognizance of opinions contrary to their own it is, of course, 
ridiculous to assume that five men cannot feel perfectly sure that 
they are right simply because four men whose opinions they respect 
disagree with them. Even the most naive observer of human nature 
realizes that there is hardly anything more futile than arguing with 
a convinced person. Opposition only tends to strengthen one's con-
victions that his opinions are correct. The opinions embodying the 
views of a majority or minority of a divided court are as a rule 
couched in language far more crisp and uncompromising than those 
which voice the views of a unanimous bench.58 
Furthermore, this argument that the majority of a court cannot 
be sure beyond reasonable doubt that a law is invalid simply because 
the minority disagrees has the awkward consequence of proving too 
much. If the conflicting views of their colleagues must of necessity 
produce this uncertainty of mind in the majority, why should not 
11 "The rule that a statute to be held void must clearly be bad means that 
each judge of a majority shall be clear in his own mind. It is supposed to 
be the duty of a judge to make up his mind for himself and not to let his 
decision be controlled by the opinion of anybody else. What would be a 
rank absurdity would be to direct a jury to acquit if they could not agree, 
and it is a ranker absurdity to suggest that a judge ought to acquiesce in 
what he believes to be a violation of constitutional right and a denial of 
justice to the parties before him. because some of his colleagues think dif-
ferently." Green, op. cit., 47 AMER. LAW REv. go, 98 . 
.. There was, for instance, no uncertainty of conviction in the mind of 
Mr. Justice Daniel when he penned the following words in his opinion in the 
Dred Scott Case: "Scarcely anything more illogical or extravagant can be 
imagined than the attempt to deduce from this provision in the constitution 
a power to destroy or in any wise to impair the civil and political rights of 
the United States. * * * 
"There can exist no rational or natural connection of affinity between 
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the same result be produced by the disagreement of other learned 
men 'whose opinions are entitled to respect? The knowledge that 
Mr. Hughes, Mr. Taft, and Mr. Root after impartial consideration 
had concluded a law to be constitutional might and probably would 
be quite as disturbing to the assurance of mind with which a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion as would 
be opposing views of their own colleagues. Of course the applica-
tion of any such test of reasonable doubt as this would ·create a situa-
tfon in which no law would ever be held invalid ·because there could 
always be found some lawyer of distinction to assert that it was 
valid. ·rt must be qmcluded that the only sensible construction to 
place upon the doctrine of reasonable doubt is the one stated above: 
namely, the majority of the court~ being legally empowered to de-
cide the question, should not hold a law unconstitutional if any rea-
sonable doubt as to its invalidity remains in their own minds. The 
doubts or conflicting views of every one else including their dissent-
ing associates they may ignore. 
There is plenty of evidence tha~ this is exactly the interpretation 
which the courts themselves have placed upon the doctrine of rea-
sonable doubt. Without pretending to have examined the mass of 
cases in which there have been disagreements amongst judges on 
questions of constitutionality, the writer i~ an extended search has 
found no case in which such a division of opinion has been regarded 
as evidence that a reasonable doubt existed as to the invalidity of 
the statute, which doubt must compel the court to uphold the law 
even when a majority of the judges regarded it as invalid. Courts 
seem to have proceeded upon the simple assumption that all the doc-
a pretension like this and the power vested by the constitution in Congress 
with regard to the territories, on the contrary, there is ari absolute incongruity 
between them. * * * 
"The injustice and extravagance necessarily implied in a supposition like 
this, cannot be rationally imputed to the patriotic or the honest, or to those 
who were merely sane." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 48g (1856). 
Note also the opening words of Mr. Justice McKenna's dissent in the 
recent Housing Law decision: "The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Van De-
vanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds and I dissent from the opinion and judg-
ment of the court. 'I'he grounds· of dissent are the explicit provisions of the 
constitution of the United States; the specifications of the grounds are the 
irresistible deductions from those provisions and, we think, would require 
no expression but for the opposition of those whose judgments challenge 
attention." Block v. Hirsh, decided April 18, 1921. No. 640, Oct. Term, 1920. 
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trine requires is that the majority of the court be sure in their own 
minds that their conclusions are correct. Furthermore, while dis-
senting justices have criticized, belabored and excoriated their ma-
jority colleag-ues for deciswns they regard as wrong, and while they 
have charged them with violating the doctrine of reasonable doubt, 
no cas< has been discovered in which a minority judge has accused 
the majority of violating that doctrine simply because they ignored 
the dissenters. 
II. ExPEDIENcY ol" REQUIRING Mo~ THAN A B~ MAJORITY 
OF A COURT TO DEC!,~ A LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Having reviewed the so-called "reasonable doubt'' argument 
against five-to-four decisions holding statutes void, it remains to con-
sider whether upon general grounds of expediency and public policy 
it would be desirable to establish a rule that laws may be invalidated 
only by a unanimous court or by some extraordinary majority of its 
members. As was indicated at the beginning of this paper, agitation 
in favor of such a rule began in 1823 and has continued ever since. 
Between 1823 and 1830 at least six proposals of this kind were made 
in Congress,no and two others were made in 1867 and l86g respec-
tively.00 A bill requiring unanimous decisions was introduced by 
.. These are collected in Warren's valuable articles on Legislative and 
Judicial attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States, 47 AM£R. LAW 
Rev. I, 161. They are as follows: (1) Resolution by Senator Johnson of 
Kentucky, Dec. 1823, see note 2, supra; (2) March n, 1824, Senator Martin 
Van Buren reported a bill which, as amended, required the concurrence of 
seven out of ten judges, each judge writing a separate opinion. This was 
laid on the table and never acted upon. (3) In 1825 Representative Robert 
P. Letcher (Va.) i!ltroduced a resolution requiring the concurrence of five 
out of seven judges. Again there was no action. (4) Jan. 26, 1826, the 
House passed by a vote of 126 to 59, a bill to increase the membership of 
the court to ten. Van Buren reported the bill in the Senate, where an amend-
ment was moved by Senator Rowan of Kentucky requiring that seven of the 
ten judges must concur i1i all cases. The amendment and bill were lost. 
(5) Jan. 22, 1827, Representative Wickliffe of Kentucky introduced a bill to 
require five out of seven judges to invalidate laws. (6) Jan. 21, 1829, Repre-
sentative Barbour (later a member of the Supreme Court) as Chairman of 
the judiciary committee reported a bill similar to that introduced by Wick· 
liffe. 
eo In 1867, Representative Williams of Pennsylvania introduced a bill re-
quiring unanimous decisions of the court upon constitutional questions, 
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Senator Bourne in l9II.61 After nearly every unpopular five-to-
four decision there has been more or less comment indicating dissat-
isfaction with the rule making such decisions possible. 
These various proposals and discussions have borne some fruit. 
Even Marshall felt the need of making some concessions to those 
who were accusing the Supreme Court of invalidating state laws by 
a bare majority of a quorum, and in 1834 laid down a rule that the 
Court would not invalidate a state law unless a majority of a full 
bench (seven at that time) should concur in the·decision.62 This rule 
has prevailed ever .since in the United States courts and has been 
adopted also in the <:ourts of several states.63 In 1912 Ohio adopted 
a constitutional amendment providing that all but one of the judges 
of the supreme court of the state must concur in a decision holding 
a statute unconstitutional unless such decision is in affrmance of the 
decision t)f the lower court.6' In 1918 the constitution of North 
W.ARR£N, .op. cil., 188. In 1868, Representative Wilson introduced a bill which 
required a two-thirds majority of the court to invalidate any act of Con-
gress. This bill passed the House but not the Senate, WARREN, op. cit., 189. 
01 The text of this bill together with Senator Bourne's speech in its de-
fense, is printed as an appendix to Collins' FouR'l'SSNTH AMSNDMJ;NT AND 
THS STA'l'SS, 184-187 • 
.. "The practice of this court is not (except in cases of absolute neces-
sity) to deliver any judgment in cases where constitutional questions are in-
volved unless four judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of 
a majority of the whole court." New York v. Miln, 8 Peters 102, 122 (1834). 
Warren points out the practical significance of this rule. "It is interest-
ing to note that if the court had followed the precedent which (it was 
charged) had been set in 1823, in Green v. Biddle, and had delivered its 
opinion by a mere majority of the judges present, the whole course of 
American legal history would have been changed; for the constitutional 
cases then pending were Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, New York 
v. Miln, and Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky-cases of 
immense importance, involving the subjects of monopoly, interstate com-
merce, and State's Rights, all three of which the Supreme Court, under 
Taney as Chief Justice, in 1837 (after Marshall's death), decided quite con-
trary to the view held by Marshall in 1834" WARREN, op. cit., 166. 
03 Discussed with elaborate citation of cases in 15 CORPUS Jurus, 938, 
7 Rm.ING CASS LAW 10o6. For requirements of this kind in state constitu-
tions see IND!';X DlGSS'l' OF STATS CONSTITUTIONS, 384. 
"'"No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court 
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the 
affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitu-
tional and void." CoNS'l'ITU!.l'lON OF OHIO, Art. IV, Sec. 2. 
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Dakota was so amended as to require the concurrence of four of 
the five judges of the supreme court to declare any statute invalid.65 
A constitutional amendment somewhat similar to this was submitted 
to the people of Minnesota for ratification in 1914 but was not 
adopted.66 Several proposals of the same general nature were dis-
cussed at length in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention in 
1918, but did not secure the support of that body.67 This whole 
problem was presented clearly to the Illinois Constitutional Conven-
tion, which at the time of writing has not yet completed its work, 
in the reports prepared for the use of that body by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau of that state. 68 So that on the whole there seems 
to be at the present time evidence of some demand for the sort of re-
striction under consideration. 
l. Arguments in Favor of the Restriction. Now what are the 
principal arguments upon which the demand for the unanimity rule, 
or some approach to it, rests? In the first place, it is urged that to 
"""The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, a majority of whom 
shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a .decision, * * * pro-
vided, however, that in no case shall any legislative enactment or law of the 
State of North Dakota be declared unconstitutional unless at least four of 
the judges shaII so decide." CoNSTI'rU'l'ION oF NORTH DAKO'l'A, Sec. Sg. 
94 "The Supreme court shaII consist of one chief justice and six associate 
justices. Five shall constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of at least 
four shall be necessary to a decision, but no statute shall .be declared uncon-
stitutional unless five members of the court shaII concur in the decision." 
Proposed amendment to Constitution of Minn. Art. 6, Sec. 2, Laws of 
I9IJ, 893. 
"' There were three such proposals. One required a unanimous bench to 
invalidate a statute, one the concurrence of aII but one judge, and one the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the court. D£BA'tt5 IN MASS. CoNSTI'l'U'l'IONAI. 
CONVENTION, I9I7-I9I8, I, 453. For elaborate discussion of these proposals 
see ibid, 454-54I . 
.. See Bulletin No. 10 on The Judicial Department, etc., 857-861. See 
also Report upon Judicial Control over Legislatures as to ·constitutional 
Questions prepared by Jackson H. Ralston for and at the request of the 
American Federation of Labor in I9I9. Among the proposals therein con-
tained (p. 62) is the following: "That the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to declare an act of the state legis-
lature or of any state or Federal agency including the judiciary, to be un-
constitutional, shall only do so by the acquiescence of considerably more 
than a bare majority of its members; that, for instance, three-fourths of the 
entire membership of the court should concur to such end, and the like re-
quirement shall hold as to the highest courts of the states." 
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allow the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional by a de-
cision of five to· four is to place undue power in the hands of one 
man.69 It is this one judge who renders the decision of the court 
and who actuaJly invalidates the law. He alone can overrule both 
houses of ·Congress, the President, and all the lower courts. This 
one judge, urge the critics, ought not to exercise such stupendous 
power, nor ought any one man to be asked to assume such enor~ 
mous responsibility. Such a concentration of authority is incom-
patible with any notion of a legislative branch of government en-
dowed with coordinate powers. 
. In the second .place, it is contended that such a rule as that under 
discussion would operate as a .substantial check upon the exercise 
by the courts of the power to invalidate laws. Fewer statutes would 
be declared unconstitutional, and this on the whole would be a good 
thing. Especially would such a result be desirable in the field of 
police legislation, where under the present system many laws are 
held void by closely divided courts largely because the judges disa-
gree with the legislature upon broad questions of social and eco-
nomic policy. :Here at least it would be a good thing to make it sub-
stantially more difficult to overrule the legislature. '!'his whole ar-
gument proceeds upon the assumption either that the power of ju-
dicial review ought not to be enjoyed at all by the courts or that it 
ought to be exercised much less frequently. It has been true in 
general that those who have been active in furthering the adoption 
of the unanimity rule, or some approach to it, in respect to court 
decisions have been those who have felt that the courts have usurped 
the power to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes and have 
sought either to abolish it or to render it virtually ineffective. It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that a belief in the desirability 
of the rule under consideration is incompatible with a staunch advo-
cacy of the doctrine of judicial review of legislation . 
.. This point was emphasized by Mr. Bryan in his famous "Cross of 
Gold" Speech in the Democratic National Convention of 1896. He said: 
"They say that we passed an unconstitutional law; we deny it. The income 
tax law was not unconstitutional when it was passed; it was not unconstitu-
tional when it went before the Supreme Court for the first time; it did not 
become unconstitutional until one of the judges changed his mind, and we 
cannot be expected to know when a judge will change his mind." SPSCHES 
OF WY. JENNINGS BRYAN, I, 242. 
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The third and most substantial argument in favor of this restric-
tum on the c• 11rt ts that it would increase popular confidence in the 
court and stimulate new respect for its decisions upon constitutional 
questions. With such a rule in force laws could still be held uncon-
stitutional but upon such occasions the court would present a more 
united front. It is natural for people to feel, and there is not the 
slightest question that many people do feel, that a five-to-four de-
cision is not a permanent or satisfactory disposition of a constitu-
tional question. 'I'.he margin is too close. There is more than a 
fighting chance that the decision may be reversed or modified. Ev-
ery decision invalidating a statute by a five-to-four vote is played up 
in the press and in the weekly journals. The very fact that the 
judges are almost evenly divided makes the decision better "copy" 
from the journalistic standpoint. The result is that the man in the 
street is very apt to acquire gradually the impression that the time 
of the Supreme Court is chiefly occupied in invalidating what he 
regards as useful legislation and that this nefarious work is almost 
invariably accomplished by a five-to-four decision. That this im-
pression is based upon almost complete ignorance of the facts is 
irrelevant since there is not the slightest hope that ~e man in the 
street will ever be made to understand clearly or accurately how the 
Supreme Court works or what it actually does. The important 
thing is that these five-to-four decisions stick in the minds of the 
average citizen and contribute to the all too prevalent distrust and 
dislike of our highest tribunal. If the unanimity rule were adopted 
or a rule requiring some special majority of the court to declare a 
law void. even if some inconvenience were attached to the change, 
the result in the direction of restoring and inspiring public confi-
dence in the Supreme Court would be well worth the cost. 
2. Arg1tnients against the Restriction. Turning to the arguments 
against this proposal one is met by the contention at the outset that 
the practice of declaring laws void by five-to-four decisions does not 
place any more power in the hands of a single judge than any other 
system. There must always be some specific number necessary to 
render a decision and it must, therefore, always be the possibility, 
in a marginal decision, that if some one judge had decided differ-
ently the results would have been different. Just as it takes ~nly 
one man to "hang" a jury, so it would take but one judge, if unan-
imity were required, to prevent a court from declaring a law uncon-
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stitutional.70 The c:Jifference between the present practice and that 
which is being proposed is not that the "marginal" judge exercises 
any more or any different power in one case than in the other, but 
merely that he is rendered more conspicuous by the existing rule. 
It is argiied in the second place that the courts do not at present 
~ercise their power to invalidate laws too frequently or without 
sufficient cause and that no restriction of the kind proposed is neces-
sary as a check upon the abuse of this power. It is here pointed 
out that the Supreme Court of the United States in its entire his-
tory has invalidated no~ more than forty statutes passed by Congress 
and not more than three hundred state ·statutes or constitutional pro-
visions.71 It is further urged that of the forty odd cases holding 
acts of Congress void nearly half were decided without any dissents 
and only five were decided by a bare majority of the court. In the 
face of these statistics it seems futile to argue that five-to-four de-
cisions are so frequent as to cause a reasonable complaint. To set 
up an arbitrary barrier making it more difficult to declare laws void 
would increase the danger from ~rresponsible legislation and lessen 
the protection now enjoyed by the -citizen in respect to his constitu-
tional rights. Even in the -controversial field of the police power the 
courts are at present adopting a sufficiently liberal viewpoint and 
ought not to be hindered in the performance of their important func-
tion of curbing legislative excesses. 
It is also pointed out that there is nothing in the experience of 
. Ohio or North Dakota under the rules prevailing in t_hose states72 
to indicate that anything substantial has been accomplished by re-
quiring an extraordinary majority of the supreme court to concur in 
declaring a law void. The Ohio rule has been in effect about eight 
years and the North Dakota rule two years. In each state one case 
has been decided in which this new rule has been called into opera-
••Under a rule requiring unanimity the presence on the bench of a single 
judge who did not believe the courts ought to exercise the power of judicial 
review under any circumstances could prevent any law from being invali-
dated irrespective of the merits of the constitutional question. See PRo-
CESDINGS AND DEBAT£S, CoNSTITU'l'IONAI. CoNVJ>N'l'ION oF 0Hro, 1912, I, 102!). 
11 These figures are only approximate. They are based upon the sta-
tistical data in Blaine Moore's TH<: SUPRt?.u; CouRT AND UNCONSTITU'l'IONAL 
LtGISLA'l'ION, Columbia University, Studies in Economics, History and Public 
Law, Vol. 54, No. 2. 
72 Supra, p. 71)6. 
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tion.73 While 1t is still too early to pass any conclusive judgment 
upon the act 11al working of the rule, it is submitted that the facts 
already disclosed do not indicate that the new restrictions are likely 
to accomplish anything important in the way of results. 
Finally it is contended that the establishment of the proposed rule 
would have no appreciable effect in strengthening or stimulating 
popular confidence in or respect for the courts. The underlying 
thesis of the argument that such a result would take place is, in real-
ity, nothing more than the perfectly obvious proposition that the 
people in general would regard unanimous decisions with more re-
spect than those made by a divided court. This may, indeed, con-
stitute an argument in favor of abolishing the practise of writing 
dissenting opinions or recording dissents, all of which is a very de-
batable issue, but it has no special bearing upon the rule under dis-
cussion. This rule does not and can not make the court unanimous 
in its decisions ; nothing can do that; it merely brings about a differ-
ent result when they are not unanimous. There would still be dis-
senting opinions and then~ would still be cases in which the majority 
of the judges disagreed with the others upon the question of the 
constitutionality of statutes. The qnly difference would be in re-
spect to the power of those judges.to bring about certain legal con-
sequences. And so far as the influence on the popular mind is -con-
cerned, it may seriously be questioned which is most calculated to 
inspire distrust of the Supreme Court,-a decision invalidating a 
statute by a vote of five to four or a decision upholding a statute 
rendered by a court of nine, eight of whom believe the statute to be 
null and void.n 
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that here, as in regard 
to most questions of expediency, the opinions of intelligent people 
"Barker v. City of Akron, 98 Ohio St. 446 (1918); Daly v. Beery, 178 
N. W. 104 (1920). 
•• See also further suggestions made in the bulletin of the Illinois Legis-
lative Reference Bureau, op. cit. 861. "Requiring a certain proportion of 
judges to declare a law unconstitutional may well lead to a liberal interpre-
tation in one case, which makes a stronger popular or sentimental appeal, as 
against a strict interpretation in another case. * * * Not only this but an 
element of greater uncertainty will be added when it is known that a majority 
of a court favored a particular interpretation, but was prevented from adopt-
ing that interpretation by a constitutional provision of this character. A 
change in judicial attitude or a change in the membership of a court would 
be more likely under such conditions to result in a change of the decisions." 
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differ widely. One cannot declare dogmatically that a unanimity 
rule in respect to Supreme Court decisions ought or ought not to 
be adopted. The study which the writer has devoted to the prob-
lem, however, has not convinced him that the adoption of such a 
rule would produce beneficial results of any substantial importance. 
The popular demand for such a requirement comes from a more 
or less widespread dissatisfaction with court decisions invalidating 
. laws regarded by the layman as useful and desirable. These are in 
the main laws passed in· the exercise of the police power and relate 
to labor conditions, public health and morals. The constitutional 
issues involved have been mixed questions of law and fact and the 
courts have in some cases shown themselves unfamiliar with the 
social and economic data upon which their decisions must be predi-
cated: It seems to the writer that the most rational remedy for this 
situation is to ·establish such changes in the methods of trying cases 
involving the validity of spcial and economic legislation as would 
assure the court full access to all the data necessary for a reasonable 
and balanced judgment upon the merits of each case. Some such 
plans of this nature as those suggested by Professor Freund75 and 
Professor Kales76 would be more likely to correct such undesirable 
tendencies as may exist in the judicial review of legislation than 
would an arbitrary requirement of a unanimous decision. In 
· other words it )VOUld be more desirable to establish rules of pro-
cedure which would make it easier for the court to reach a correct 
.. Freund's suggestion is the establishment of a rule based upon the 
analogy of the appellate review of judicial decisions of fact. "It would mean 
that there must have been evidence of facts within the reach of the legisla-
ture sufficient to support its judgment that an exigency existed for its inter-
ference [in the exercise of the police power]. "Constitutional Limitations 
and Labor Legislation," 4 ILL. LAW ~~w. 623. 
••"The only way to meet the skepticism of the court * * * is to build 
up a record of· evidence in the trial court, by witnesses produced for cross 
examination-witnesses who will testify to the facts and opinions upon which 
a justification may be based, and will establish their conclusions as to those 
which, if not already generally accepted, are nevertheless certain to be ac-
cepted. Such a method of putting in a case challenges the opponents to 
produce evidence on their side. If they fail to do so the basis is laid for 
the contention in the Supreme Court that they must take tlie consequences 
of their default, and that the court cannot, in the face of full and uncontro-
verted proofs, ignore in the particular case before it facts and data which, 
if true, show a justification for the legislation in question. "New Methods 
in Due-Process Cases," 12 AMJ<:R. POLITIC.AI. Scnwci;; ~v. 249. 
FIVE TO FOUR DECISIONS 
decision upon these difficult questions than to prevent the court 
from giving effect to the judgment of a majority of its members in 
certain cases regardless of what that judgment may be. The unan-
imity rule impresses the writer as a flank movement upon a problem 
which might better be attacked in the front. 
Rom~R'l' EuGl~Nl~ CusHMAN. 
University of Minnesota. 
